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The Story of Upjohn Co. v. 
United States: One Man's 
Journey to Extend Lawyer-
Client Confidentiality, and 
the Social Forces That 
Affected It 
Paul Rothste in* 
The attorney-client privilege protects information a client provides 
an attorney in confidence for the purpose of securing legal advice . But 
suppose the client is not a person but a corporation and can only speak 
through its agents and employees. What then are the contours of the 
privilege? If the corporation's attorney asks an employee for information 
relating to pending litigation or other legal matters, is the conversation 
privileged? Some courts said that no communications to a corporate 
attorney were privileged unless they came from members of the corpo-
rate control group, loosely those people who had authority to direct the 
attorney's activities in connection with legal matters. Other courts said 
that the identity of the communicator was less important than the 
subject matter of the communication, and that even the communications 
of a lower level employee to corporate counsel would be protected, if they 
pertained to the employee's duties, if they were relevant to the corpora-
tion 's need for legal advice, and if the employee had been directed by 
appropriate corporate authority to speak to counsel on the matter. 
Suppose that you were counsel to a major corporation, and you 
wanted to investigate a matter that might have serious legal ramifica-
tions for your company, where many of the facts were in the possession 
of lower-echelon field employees. How would you proceed? What commu-
nications would you expect to be protected? Would you fight the matter 
all the way to the Supreme Court if the lower courts ordered you to 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center . 
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share with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) your notes of confidential 
communications between you and these employees? Gerard Thomas 
proceeded with great care to build the strongest case possible for 
claiming the privilege, and when two lower courts refused that claim, he 
appealed-successfully-to the United States Supreme Court, forever 
changing what corporate communications are privileged and the way 
corporate law is practiced. The case was Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 
U.S. 383 (1981). 
THE CASE AND ITS DRAMATIS PERSONAE 
Gerard Thomas today is just over 80 years old. At 6 ft. 2 inches, he 
still cuts a handsome figure, topped with an impressive mane of white 
hair.1 Officially retired less than five year s ago from his private law firm 
in Kalamazoo, Michigan, Thomas is still found at meetings there on a 
fair ly regular basis. He remains married to the same woman, after all 
these years. She, like his friends at the office, calls him " Gerry" . He 
dotes on his two grown daughters and a son-none of whom are 
lawyers-and eight grandchildren, two of whom just graduated from 
college. 
There is something Clark Kent-ish about Thomas. A true gentle-
man, he is polite, soft spoken, and courtly. It is hard to believe that 
twenty-odd years ago he doggedly faced down the IRS, winning such a 
dramatic expansion of attorney-client privilege in the process, that even 
today he is deemed a hero by the legal community. 
Indeed, the IRS probably thought from his demeanor that Thomas 
would be a push-over. They were wrong. If you listen closely when he 
talks, there are glimpses of the man of steel within. This veteran WWII 
infantry corporal didn 't win two battle stars and a purple heart for 
nothing. 
At the time of the fight with the IRS, Thomas was General Counsel, 
Vice President, and Secretary of the great American pharmaceutical 
firm , the Upjohn Company. He was also on the boards of several of its 
subsidiaries. Headquartered in Kalamazoo, where Thomas still lives, 
Upjohn had world-spanning operations in over 150 countries, requiring 
Thomas to travel from time-to-time to consult with overseas employees. 
The attorney-client victory he won in the Upjohn case involved his 
communications with some of these overseas employees-communica-
t My descriptions of Gera rd Thomas, his involvement in the case, and other matters 
related t o the case, are based on my personal interviews with Thomas and others connected 
with the case, and on court records, press accounts, corporate documents, and information 
fro m government filings, some obta ined through the Freedom of Information Act, as well 
as more traditional legal and internet sources. David Sinkman, my student research 
assistant, a ided me in various ways, and I am grateful for his help. 
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tions the IRS badly wanted to discover in order to determine Upjohn's 
tax liability. 
The precise issue in the case was whether the company's attorney-
client privilege covered written and oral exchanges between Thomas and 
lower-echelon Upjohn employees-field employees in various parts of the 
world who, unlike certain officers and directors, were not part of the 
company's " control group". It was undisputed, owing to previous cases, 
that an attorney's communications with members of the control group 
itself, being most like an individual client's communications with her 
attorney in the non-corporate context, were privileged, assuming other 
privilege requirements were met. 
Thomas prevailed in the Supreme Court. The lower-echelon commu-
nications were held sacrosanct, ushering in an era of increased confiden-
tiality and reliance on attorneys by the business community. Whether a 
lawyer was an " in-house" lawyer, like Thomas, or one hired externally 
by the corporation made no difference. 
The Upjohn decision has particular resonance today, when corporate 
fraud and the role of lawyers in facilitating or preventing it, is so much 
on the front burner. Recent abuses by executives in charge of such 
leviathons as Enron Corp., Tyco, MCI-Worldcom, and Health-South, 
have resulted in massive corporate bankruptcies and huge financial 
losses to employees, shareholders, and investors. Individual, institution-
al , and governmental retirement funds have been decimated. The entire 
national economy has suffered. Enron alone is estimated to have cost 
investors over 63 billion dollars. Does an expansive corporate attorney-
client privilege impede discovery of fraud and enable lawyers to help 
engineer legal circumventions? Or does it encourage companies and their 
employees to lay the facts fully before the attorney so she can advise 
them to stay within the law? The Supreme Court in Upjohn believed the 
latter to be a more significant effect, saying: 
The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the court 
below not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formu-
late sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal 
problem, but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate 
counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law. In light of 
the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting 
the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, con-
stantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law, particularly 
since compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive 
matter. [For just one example,] the behavior proscribed by [the 
antitrust laws] is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of 
socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct. 2 
2 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (internal quotation marks a nd citations omitted). 
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Government enforcers and regulators have a less charitable view of 
lawyers and recently have taken some counter-measures. We shall re-
turn to this later. 
Thomas' involvement with the events giving rise to Upjohn began in 
1976. Independent accountants conducting a routine audit had alerted 
Upjohn that some of Upjohn 's subsidiaries abroad or their employees 
may have made payments to foreign officials or governments in order to 
secure or facilitate business for Upjohn. Since Upjohn 's foreign subsid-
iaries were in many respects independent entities, Upjohn 's Internation-
al Division first looked into the matter without Thomas' direct partic-
ipation. But that inquiry did not come up with much. Since there were 
some aspects that might affect Upjohn on a broader basis, Thomas got 
more intimately involved. 
He does not remember precisely how it first came to his personal 
attention that Upjohn 's subsidiaries might be involved in questionable 
payments, or how he initially felt . It is likely he was notified by the 
company's chief financial officer, who may have approached him at the 
water cooler, in the hall, or over lunch in the executive dining room. A 
more formal memo would have followed . Several things undoubtedly 
flashed through Thomas's mind. That American companies and their 
subsidiaries were making such payments was not news. The practice was 
beginning to be discussed in business circles and, very disparagingly, by 
the press. Congress was considering legislation to curb the payments, 
and something called the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was eventually 
passed, but too late to affect this case. However, there already were laws 
on the books that made such payments potentially illegal at home and 
abroad. 
Thomas obviously knew the realities . Foreign governmental entities 
often purchased American products, including pharmaceuticals, for their 
populations, or required that official permission be obtained to sell 
through other channels. Formal or informal fees , legally authorized or 
not, were frequently exacted as a prerequisite to doing such business. 
International competition for these lucrative marketing opportunities 
was intense. Many companies or their employees believed that paying 
informal " fees" was necessary for American firms to stay competitive. In 
some instances it was not clear whether the payments were illegal 
bribes, or a form of "cu stomary law"-that is, an informal license fee 
that was an accepted part of doing business in the country. Just as 
formally prescribed license fees could be properly paid, so could these, 
the argument went- particularly in a country where there was little 
formal law or where the line between formal law and customary practice 
was blurry. Some of these informal payments might appear to be part of 
the understood "salary" for otherwise low-paid or unpaid officials, much 
like the theoretically optional but universally expected tip one gives to 
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waiters in a restaurant. There were other ambiguities as well: Was 
treating an official to dinner at a fine restaurant, or giving him or his 
family a small gift, improper? Would it be considered impolite not to do 
so? How large or lavish must a dinner or gift be to be improper? But not 
everything was in the gray area. Clearly, there were circumstances 
where everyone should realize that a payment because of its size, 
expected benefit, or recipient, was flat out wrong. 
Thomas also knew that this was the immediate post-Watergate era. 
A candidate for U.S. President named Jimmy Carter was running on a 
platform calling for a "return to ethics," and it was all but certain he 
would win. American politicians and corporate executives were facing 
public anger over secret political contributions and corporate bribery at 
home and abroad. The press, public, and government investigators were 
keen to discover more Watergate-like scandals. "Bananagate", for exam-
ple, revealed that the United Fruit Company, the world 's predominant 
supplier of bananas, was bribing officials in tropical countries where 
bananas were grown. United Fruit and other companies were found to 
have maintained unaccounted-for "slush" funds-likened to President 
Nixon 's famous slush fund that had financed the Watergate break-in. 
These corporate slush funds were used to bribe and make under-the-
table political contributions to domestic and foreign politicians. Compa-
nies were getting into trouble with the IRS and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), for not properly disclosing the payments 
or their true nature to regulators, for deducting them from income, and 
for failing to report or identify them (or the foreign and domestic civil 
and criminal liabilities they potentially entailed) to investors, as required 
by American law. Currency regulations and foreign laws were also being 
violated. If Upjohn were making payments to foreign officials, it would 
be viewed very much askance, to say the least. 
Thomas called a meeting with Ray ("Ted") Parfet, Jr. , Upjohn's 
Chairman of the Board, and others in the company. In a move to fend off 
possible legal trouble as well as a public relations nightmare, they 
launched an internal investigation into these questionable payments. It 
would cover the preceding several years through to the present. Thomas 
was in charge. He was assisted by an in-house staff of three or four 
lawyers, a secretary, and a couple of part-time paralegals. Because 
foreign payments could affect Upjohn 's federal securities and tax obli-
gations, Thomas called upon the old-line patrician Washington D.C. law 
firm of Covington & Burling, specialists who over the years had assisted 
Upjohn 's legal department in federal matters. They could now help 
structure the investigation and help prepare oral and written questions 
to ask the foreign employees. 
Thomas says these questions were structured not as much to pre-
serve a possible future attorney-client privilege claim, as to get the facts 
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o that Upjohn and their subsidiaries could comply with domestic and 
foreign legal requirements. 
The investigation included written questionnaires and letters sent to 
"All Foreign General and Area Managers" . They were signed by Parfet. 
These questionnaires addressed "possibly illegal payments to foreign 
government officials" and solicited all information relating to any such 
payments. The letters informed the managers of Thomas ' leading role in 
conducting the investigation and instructed that all responses should be 
sent directly to him . Because the inquiry was " highly confidential" the 
managers were told to restrict the information to as few Upjohn employ-
ee a nece sary. By thus underlining the role of Thomas, his status as 
exclusive recipient of responses, the legal purposes of the investigation, 
the restricted confidential nature of the communications, and the em-
ployees' authorization by the corporation to speak to its counsel, Thomas 
and Covington enhanced the likelihood that the communications would 
be held privileged in any future challenge, as well as the likelihood 
employees would make significant disclosures. 
Another part of the investigation included live interviews, mostly 
conducted by Thomas personally, of the foreign managers and thirty-
three other employees. He traveled to approximately fifteen or twenty 
different developed and underdeveloped countries-places in Mexico, 
Central and South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa-to speak with 
employees who made or knew of payments. The trips, often arduous, 
lasted for weeks or even months. Once, in Egypt, Thomas was jailed 
overnight for not having the right medical inoculations. Coming from a 
company that manufactured them, he should have been more savvy. But 
he had overlooked the fact that, because he stopped to do interviews in 
Kenya before going on to Egypt, he needed more shots than if he had 
come straight from the U.S. He was told he was being taken to a Holiday 
Inn, but it turned out to be a jail. The only resemblance to a Holiday Inn 
was the guards' green blazers, Thomas says. He was more than a little 
frightened by their machine guns and the fact that an Ethiopian in his 
cell said he had been there for days for a similar infraction 
Thomas wanted to do most of the oral interviews personally. This 
certainly would increase the credibility of any future claim of attorney-
client privilege, but he says that was not his only purpose. As in the 
written questionnaires, he wanted to assure the employees that they 
could be forthright with him, despite any self-damaging revelations, 
because the company would do all it could to protect them. His subse-
quent fight for confidentiality, all the way to the Supreme Court, 
suggests his promise was not empty. 
Thomas's approach in the interviews emphasized that the company 
valued its employees, had always treated them fairly, regarded them in 
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many respects as family, and would be loyal. He told them he knew they 
had been trying to help the company, but that now the company needed 
their assistance in the investigation. He says today that for the most 
part, employees trusted the company. It had been founded near the turn 
of the century by an honorable pillar of the Kalamazoo community, Dr. 
William Erastus Upjohn, who had achieved wealth by inventing the 
friable pill, the key to modern pharmaceuticals.3 Dr. Upjohn, himself the 
son of a respected local doctor, went on to become one of the country's 
great philanthropists. The Upjohn family remained involved in the 
ownership and management of the company, and continued and expand-
ed the great philanthropic tradition of Dr. Upjohn. The company, Thom-
as says, always put a high value on integrity, and the employees knew 
that. So they cooperated. No doubt, "Gerry" Thomas's extremely per-
sonable nature had a lot to do with it. 
Many of the employees abroad told him that, if you were doing 
business in their country, you must pay somebody, especially in the 
social services and health field. They said often there was no real 
government to deal with . Doing business was prevented by somebody 
unless " palms were greased" . In many instances, he was told, it was 
hard to tell whether someone seeking payments and in a position to 
impede business was a governmental agent or a private party. Yet the 
legality of the payment under both foreign and U.S. law might hinge on 
that. 
Some of the payments he was told about seemed relatively insignifi-
cant. In Mexico, for example, " government" drivers of company employ-
ees would get lost or delayed unless an amount, ranging from $2 to $20 
was added to the charge under the table. In some countries, he was told, 
one had to be careful not to "tip" too much, or "you would look 
ignorant". Frequently, the amount had to be big enough for the recipient 
to divide with others. Sometimes payments were "in kind". For example, 
company employees may have had to see that someone in a key position 
got a telephone installed in their home. 
But many of the stories he heard undoubtedly involved more signifi-
cant payments, to people as low on the chain as purchasing agents, or as 
high as the head of a major governmental department, or even higher, in 
more questionable circumstances. Thomas does not feel free to talk 
about those. But he says he told the employees that the questionable 
payments must stop. 
3 A fri able pill is dissolvable, made of compacted powder. P reviously, pills were 
unyieldi ngly hard, passing through the bodily system undissolved. Medicine had to be 
administered in liquid form . Dr. Upjohn 's marketing to doctors involved send ing a hammer 
and two pills on a board-one friable, one not- a nd inviting the doctor to hammer them 
both. One would smash into powder, one would dent the board. The logo of t he Upjohn 
Company for many years was a t iny depiction of this hammer-and-board experiment . 
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Some of the employees Thomas interviewed had felt that they 
houldn 't bother their employer about the payments made to grease the 
wheels of business. They felt they were protecting Upjohn. If told, the 
company might have to halt the practice, costing it business and putting 
it at a competitive disadvantage. But many of these same employees 
seemed relieved that the company had now found out and wanted to 
know more. 
There was a feeling on the part of some of those Thomas inter-
viewed that "everybody does it- it is a part of the culture of this 
country-penaltie against it are not enforced-you cannot practicably 
apply U.S. tandards here." It may also be supposed that at least some 
employees themselves benefited, as employees, from the increased sales, 
in terms of commissions, promotion, or the like. There was little sugges-
tion, though , that any employees got direct kickbacks. 
Upon their return to the United States, Thomas and his staff put 
together provisional materials about the payments based on his notes of 
the interviews and the answers to the written interrogatories. (It is the 
privileged status of these notes and answers that subsequently became 
the main subject of the Upjohn case. But we are getting ahead of the 
story. ) 
The SEC was investigating foreign payments generally, and may 
have gotten wind of the fact that Upjohn might be involved. Under SEC 
disclosure regulations, such payments, and potential legal liabilities 
connected with them, had to be clearly reported and identified in 
shareholder and other material. Few companies, including Upjohn, had 
done so, often being ignorant of the payments or their true nature. Some 
companies, however , were purposely covering up. 
Thomas and Covington & Burling consulted and decided that early 
disclosure to the SEC of what Upjohn 's investigation had found would 
mitigate whatever penalties the SEC might ultimately impose on them 
for violation of these reporting requirements over the last several years. 
Stanley Sporkin-subsequently General Counsel of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and later a Federal District Judge in Washington, D.C-
was the head of enforcement at the SEC at the time. He had instituted a 
policy encouraging early cooperation and disclosure by a company, of 
possible law infractions, even in advance of any SEC investigation. He 
would reward such self-reporting with a reduction or elimination of any 
penalties the company might eventually face . He fe lt this would supple-
ment his own resources, greatly expanding the number of potential 
violations the SEC could feasibly and economically investigate. In addi-
tion to generally publicizing his policy, he went so far as to send letters 
to companies he suspected of violations, urging them to investigate and 
report on themselves. Sporkin, known as a "Washington wunderkind," 
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is credited with the first large-scale program encouraging such self-
investigation and self-reporting. It has since been widely copied and 
expanded by other agencies. Today, Sporkin-an enthusiastic and tire-
lessly energetic person- has retired from the bench and is practicing in 
a Washington, D.C. law firm that, perhaps ironically, is handling the 
bankruptcy of Enron. 
After ubstantial input by Covington & Burling and others in 
Upjohn, a summary report of some of Thomas's findings, based on some 
of his notes and some of the interrogatory answers, was produced and 
submitted to the SEC on the appropriate official forms, with a copy to 
the IRS. It included only summaries of those transactions the lawyers 
representing Upjohn felt were relevant. The company's disclosures ap-
peared to be motivated in part by Sporkin's promise of more lenient 
treatment for voluntary compliance and Thomas's own conviction that 
early disclosure is best. 
The SEC ultimately seemed satisfied with this material , after some 
supplemental disclosures. 
The IRS, however, took a firmer stance and soon began investigat-
ing the tax consequences of the questionable payments. For example, 
were payments deducted from Upjohn 's income when they should not 
have been? As part of its inquiry, the IRS demanded production of " all 
files relevant to the investigation conducted under the supervision of 
Gerard Thomas to identify payments to employees of foreign govern-
ments and any political contributions made by the Upjohn Company or 
any of its affiliates." The IRS also specifically asked for the answers to 
the written questionnaires and all memos or notes of all Thomas's 
interviews. At first the requests were made only in letters and discus-
sions with Thomas and Covington & Burling. Upjohn declined to pro-
duce the answers and interview materials, claiming that the attorney-
client privilege protected them, but the company offered to make people 
they had interviewed available for interrogation about the facts that they 
knew (as opposed to what they told attorneys about them), not a large 
concession since such information is not protected by the attorney-client 
privilege anyway. 
The IRS then turned up the heat , issuing a "summons" for the 
refused information. A special statute and accompanying regulations 
permit this IRS summons procedure. Only a few agencies can issue such 
summonses. They are supposed to be issued only in connection with civil 
investigations (which, so far , this was) but are not invalidated by the fact 
that, as here, the possibility of using the information summoned in 
subsequent criminal proceedings has not been ruled out. Tax infractions 
can lead to either civil or criminal proceedings, depending upon how 
aggravated and intentional they prove to be. 
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Technically, an IRS summons is issued and signed by the special 
agent in charge of the investigation. In this case, the special agent was 
David Nowak, a tough, uncompromising, no-nonsense enforcer of fear-
ome reputation who was not satisfied with the voluntary disclosures 
that had been made by Upjohn. His summons was addressed to Thomas 
and Upjohn by name. They refused to comply with it. Under the statute, 
the special agent can then go to the Federal District Court to get the 
ummons enforced with a court order that, if violated, results in punish-
ment. 
On August 31 , 1977, Agent Nowak requested the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan to enforce the 
summons and compel production of the documents. As customary, the 
caption of the case prominently bore Agent Nowak's name as the party 
eeking enforcement, and the names of Gerard Thomas and Upjohn as 
the parties resisting enforcement. This is the case that ultimately went 
to the Supreme Court. 
In the District Court in cases of this kind, a Magistrate-an assis-
tant to the District Judge-normally hears the case first . The Magistrate 
listens to witnesses, examines documentary evidence, and considers 
points of law raised by both sides, and then makes a recommendation to 
the District Judge, supported by detailed reasoning, concerning whether 
or not to enforce the summons. The District Judge can adopt, reject, or 
modify the recommendation. Sometimes the Judge takes additional 
evidence, or sends the case back to the Magistrate to hear more evidence 
or make additional findings or clarifications. After the District Judge 
finally rules, a dissatisfied party can appeal to the Court of Appeals, and 
thereafter to the Supreme Court, if the Supreme Court thinks the issue 
is important enough. 
Upjohn and Thomas were represented before the Magistrate by local 
Michigan counsel and Covington & Burling, since Upjohn's in-house 
lawyers did not try cases. However, some in-house lawyers on Thomas's 
staff who had participated in strategy sessions were at counsel table and 
on the papers. The lawyers argued attorney-client privilege, work-prod-
uct, and some minor points of statutory and regulatory authority. The 
privilege against self-incrimination was not invoked because corporations 
and corporate officials have no such privilege covering corporate docu-
ments. 
Agent Nowak explained in testimony before the Magistrate why he 
was not satisfied with only the disclosures Upjohn had voluntarily made 
to the IRS (basically the summaries of some of the transactions Upjohn 's 
investigation had discovered that had been given to the SEC). Like any 
tough law enforcer, Nowak did not want to take Upjohn 's word for which 
transactions and details were relevant and what their import was: 
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Q. [By Government Attorney]: Why do you feel that you should 
have these documents .. . rather than take the Upjohn Company's 
assurance as to what the relevance of those documents [is]? 
A. [By Nowak]: Well, I feel that those files may contain evidence 
that would indicate that there is in fact a tax implication involved in 
payments which the company has alleged have no U.S. tax implica-
tion. These files may contain leads or other evidence that would 
have a relationship to those payments that the company does admit 
have a U.S. tax implication. I believe that it would-if it served no 
other purpose--it would help me corroborate the company 's position 
that there is no tax impact, if that is what the facts would show 
upon my investigation of the files. 
Thomas himself appeared as the other principal witness. He testified 
regarding the physical events of the investigation, including his trips and 
the sending of the questionnaires. He characterized his interview notes 
as follows: 
My notes would contain what I considered to be the important 
questions, the substance of the responses to them, my beliefs as to 
the importance of these, my beliefs as to how they related to the 
inquiry, my thoughts as to how they related to other questions. In 
some instances they might even suggest other questions that I 
would have to ask, or things that I needed to find elsewhere. They 
were more than just a verbatim report of my conversation with 
the--a report of my conversation in the interviews. 
He reiterated that Upjohn would voluntarily make current employ-
ees available to the IRS for questioning except for those Upjohn deemed 
totally irrelevant. But Upjohn declined to absorb travel expenses the IRS 
might incur in such interviews. Moreover, some of the people involved 
were former employees that Upjohn could no longer produce. But none 
of this would necessarily prevent the IRS from using its own resources 
and auspices to obtain interviews. Interviewing witnesses would of 
course be more difficult and expensive than examining the documents, 
and the IRS could not be sure the witnesses would be as frank as they 
had been in Thomas' inquiry. 
The Magistrate ruled in the government's favor, giving several 
grounds: the privilege applies only to communications of the control 
group, and anyway the limited disclosures to the SEC and IRS had the 
effect of waiving the privilege as to almost everything that had been 
communicated, whether that was intended or not.4 The District Judge 
4 The Magistrate also ruled that the work-product doctrine did not apply to material 
requested in an IRS summons, but if it did , it was overcome by the IRS' need for the 
information. 
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ummarily adopted the Magistrate's opinion in all respects and ordered 
production of the allegedly protected material. 
On Thomas's and Covington's recommendation, Upjohn appealed to 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which rejected the lower 
court 's finding of waiver, holding that waiver only occurred as to 
information actually given to the IRS and SEC-a very narrow waiver 
that ound like it should have been good news for Upjohn. 
But the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the 
privilege did not apply "to the extent the communications were made by 
officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn 's actions in 
re ponse to legal advice"-virtually all the communications at issue 
here-because these communications, being made by people not in the 
corporate " control group," were not made as part of any attorney-client 
relationship. The Court of Appeals was worried that extending the 
privilege further, as some Courts of Appeals had done, would encourage 
upper-echelon management to ignore unpleasant facts and would create 
a broad " zone of silence."5 So, although Upjohn may not have waived its 
privilege, as to most of the material there was no privilege to be waived 
to begin with. This was a crushing loss. 
Upjohn had been roundly defeated twice: in the trial court, and in 
the appeals court. A lesser man than Thomas might have caved. But he 
knew there was one last chance to preserve the confidentiality of the 
information he had collected, and he convinced the company to take it. 
That last chance was to persuade the United States Supreme Court, 
first, to take the case, and second, to address the merits of the case and 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 
Upjohn's strongest argument for taking the case was that a conflict 
of authority existed among lower courts on the question of who in a 
corporation may make privileged communications to the corporation's 
attorney. In advancing this argument, Upjohn stressed the legal profes-
sion's urgent need to know precisely the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege in the corporate context. 
5 The Court of Appeals also agreed with the lower court that work-product protection 
did not apply. The decision did not directly address whether someone other than top 
execu ti ves in Upjohn might be considered in a co nt rol group of sort --e.g., regional 
managers who might have a uthority to act on legal advice relating to their own regions. 
This possibility had been recognized by some decision . Nor did the decision discuss 
whether investigating foreign payments was more a business functi on than a profess ional 
legal functio n, which wo uld st rip communications related thereto of attorney-client privi-
lege. This possibili ty has been considered in other unrelated cases, particula rly where the 
lawyer wears two hats, as Thomas did ; tha t is, holds a legal position and a business 
position in the compa ny. The in vestigation here had been constructed in a way that would 
maximize the cla im that legal concerns were foremost. 
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Thomas and Covington were pleased but not really surprised when 
the Supreme Court "granted certiorari"-that is, agreed to hear the 
case-because it is well known that the Justices like to resolve important 
conflicts among the Federal Circuits. Resolving such conflicts is one of 
the most important functions of the Court and a primary reason the 
Court gives for reviewing lower court decisions. 
UNDERCUTTING AN ANCIENT PRIVILEGE 
To understand the Supreme Court's ultimate decision on the merits 
of the case, we first need to review a few basics about the privilege. 
The attorney-client privilege provides that, with certain exceptions, 
confidential communications between an attorney and her client are not 
to be received as evidence in judicial and similar proceedings. Originally 
based on a notion of the lawyer's honor (a gentleman would not reveal 
the confidences of another), today the privilege is supported on other 
grounds. Combined with the roughly parallel ethical obligation of attor-
ney not to disclose client information in venues outside of those covered 
by privilege, the privilege is believed to encourage clients to truthfully 
reveal to the attorney everything the client knows that might bear on 
the legal advice sought by the client, regardless of whether the advice is 
sought to prepare for litigation or for other legal purposes. The lawyer 's 
ability to provide sound legal advice is thought to provide a number of 
social benefits that more than compensate for any loss of evidence-not 
the least of which is that the lawyer may be able to avert illegal action by 
the client. It is also argued that courts and other public entities make 
better decisions if they are presented with fully informed legal argu-
ments, and when clients tell their lawyers everything, sounder legal 
documents and transactions also result. 
From at least the early 19th century on there have been scholars 
who have wanted to abolish or restrict the privilege, including the 
celebrated philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who, in Rationale of Judicial 
Evidence (1827), authored a particularly scathing critique. However, the 
privilege has withstood most assaults. Its roots are deep. They stretch 
back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I, and some scholar think the 
privilege may be traced as far back as the Roman Empire, where the 
notion that a lawyer could not be a witness against his client was an 
accepted principle. 
Courts developed the attorney-client privilege for the individual 
client. The rise of the modern corporation has created enormous prob-
lems in identifying the client for purposes of the privilege. Unlike an 
individual person, a corporation is an artificial body lacking the human 
dignity and personal rights that the privilege seeks to protect. While 
attorneys generally rely on the individual client as the sole source of 
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information about their case, a corporation has many individual workers, 
from the factory worker to the door-to-door salesman to the chief 
executive, each with his or her own story to tell. As corporations grew in 
ize and complexity during the 20th century, information and responsi-
bility were dispersed across the globe. Thus questions arise in the 
corporate context that do not exist with individual clients. As a result, 
American courts have struggled, particularly since the 1960s, to define 
the cope of this privilege as it relates to corporations. While it is 
generally agreed that in most circumstances only those who run the 
corporation can claim (or waive) the privilege, there has been substan-
tially le agreement on the range of protected communications. Before 
Upjohn, courts and commentators frequently asked, " Does the privilege 
protect communications between every employee and the corporation's 
lawyers? Or does the privilege only protect communications between 
executives and corporate counsel? Or is the answer somewhere in-
between?" 
In a landmark 1962 utilities antitrust case known as Radiant 
Burners, Chief Judge Campbell of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois ruled that letters from corporate officers 
and employees sent to the corporation 's lawyers were not privileged and 
must be produced during discovery. Judge Campbell reasoned that the 
attorney-client privilege was (1) historically and fundamentally personal 
in nature and (2) the lack of confidentiality inherent in a corporate 
hierarchy diminishes the force of the privilege. As a result, he ruled 
against extending the privilege to corporations. Prior to Judge Camp-
bell 's decision, courts made no distinction between individuals and 
corporations in applying this privilege. All that was required for the 
privilege was that the information furnished to the attorney by any 
officer or employee must be given in confidence and without the pres-
ence of a third person . 
The legal backlash to Judge Campbell's decision was swift. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the ruling. Radiant 
Burners, Inc. u. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314 (1963). Citing a 
number of early U.S. and English cases, this court, sitting en bane, held 
that a corporation is entitled to the same treatment as any other client. 
The court stressed the need to encourage full disclosure by clients to 
their lawyers, reasoning that such communication is essential for a 
lawyer to be effective as counsel. Although Judge Campbell 's decision 
was overturned and most courts and legislatures showed little inclina-
tion to embrace his decision , his opinion struck a cord with many 
commentators and sparked a fierce legal debate. 
Challenged by Judge Campbell 's reasoning, courts were forced to fall 
back on a utilitarian rationale for the privilege, as articulated by the 
Seventh Circuit in Radiant Burners, to support their extension of the 
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privilege to corporations. But Judge Campbell had alerted them that 
there ar e serious arguments against a corporate privilege. The response 
of some was a compromise of sorts: the control group test , first devel-
oped in City of Philadelphia u. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F . Supp. 
483 (E .D. P a. 1962), only months after Judge Campbell 's decision. AB put 
forth in City of Philadelphia , the control group test enabled courts to 
extend the privilege to corpora tions, but in a sharply limited form . 
Under this test , a communication is protected if the person speaking or 
writing is in a " posit ion to control or even to take a substantial part in a 
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the 
advice of the attorney. " This control group t est was quickly accepted 
around the country. In fact , the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
recommended the control group test in their original proposal for the 
Rules. 
The development of the control group test was driven by several 
concerns. First , extending the privilege to statements made by all wit-
nesses seemed contrary to the Supreme Court 's decision in Hickman u. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Under Hickman , an attorney's mental 
impressions and free exchanges between clients and lawyers are protect -
ed but the knowledge of witnesses to disputed events is not protected, 
and they must provide all relevant information. Given the structure of 
the modern corporation , many employees with relevant or incriminating 
info rmation are not corporate executives and thus are arguably more 
like witnesses than clients. The control group test was intended to limit 
the privilege to only those who were most like " clients,'' i.e. , those who 
could act on the attorney's advice-the senior executives-rather than to 
protect all workers who knew damaging information (arguably more like 
''witnesses' '). 
A second concern that the control group test took into account was a 
corporation 's ability to manipulate an expansive attorney-client pr ivilege 
so as to protect embarrassing or incriminating documents. Unlike an 
individual, a corpora te client could structure its procedures so as to 
privilege much of its documentation relating to routine transactions by 
addressing it to counsel. Thus, the control group test was intended to 
remove routine intra-corporate communications from the pr ivilege's 
protection . Commentators noted, however , that there were other fea-
tures of the attorney-client privilege that could partially mitigate this 
problem. For example, communications and documents, to be privileged, 
must have been created in connection with the rendition of legal services 
rather than for business or criminal purposes. Nevertheless, a broad 
attorney-client privilege for corporations is of legitimate concern, in that 
it can deprive courts of vast amounts of information . 
Third, the control group test took into account the need for a bright-
line rule. Uncertainty about the exact limits of the privilege would erode 
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full communication between clients and their lawyers because of fears 
that the conversation would eventually be disclosed. By limiting the 
privilege to the small group of senior managers who control decision-
making, the control group test was intended to allow corporations to 
identify easily those whose communications were protected by the privi-
lege. Some commentators noted, however, that uncertainty about who is 
within the control group was inevitable. A broader test embracing all 
employees might be more certain. Leaving the matter open without any 
test is what produced the uncertainty. 
The control group test was greeted with widespread acceptance and 
was applied in all federal courts until 1970 when the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit challenged this approach in Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487. The Seventh Circuit, apparently 
again indulging its inclination in favor of a corporate attorney-client 
privilege that it had manifested in Radiant Burners, adopted a broader 
te t for determining the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege. 
It focused on the subject matter of the employee's communications 
rather than on the position of the employee who was communicating the 
information. Under the subject matter test, an employee's communica-
tion with the corporation's lawyer is privileged when made at the 
direction of a superior and when the subject matter upon which the 
attorney's advice is sought concerns the worker's employment. 
The reasoning behind this broader interpretation was clear. Oppo-
nents of the control group test argued that only by extending the 
privilege to low-level employees could attorneys adequately advise their 
corporate clients. To restrict the privilege only to communications by 
top-level executives was to ignore the realities of corporate life because 
executives often lack the information needed by attorneys to formulate 
sound legal advice. 
The subject matter test's emphasis on ensuring effective legal advice 
won many adherents, and when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Harper & Row it was thought that the choice between the control group 
and subject matter tests would soon be made. However, the Court, being 
shy one member, divided four to four on the issue, resulting in a 
summary affirmation without opinion, of the Seventh Circuit's decision. 
Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 400 U.S. 955 (1971), rehearing 
denied 401 U.S. 950 (1971). In law, a split decision furnishes no guiding 
precedent. It did, however, lead the drafters of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to drop their proposal to add the control group test to the 
Rules, leaving the matter open. Congress thereafter decided not to 
include specific rules of privilege in the Federal Rules, with the result 
that further elucidation of the scope of the federal corporate attorney-
client privilege was relegated (along with federal privileges generally) to 
case-by-case development by the courts. 
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Federal courts in the 1970s usually adopted either the control group 
or the subject matter test, though some courts applied variations or even 
a synthesis of the two. The best-known elaboration of the subject matter 
test was Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (1978), 
where the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit required that for a 
lower level corporate employee's communications to be privileged, they 
must be made at the direction of the employee's superiors and must 
cover information within the employee's duties. In addition, the court 
required that the communication be made for the purpose of getting 
legal services for the corporation and be kept confidential within the 
corporation. The court reasoned that these requirements would limit the 
privilege to legitimate attorney-client communications as opposed to 
regular business dealings, thus taking care of some of the concerns that 
had led courts to adopt the control-group approach. 
This brings us to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's 
decision in Upjohn, which was a classic application of the control group 
test. The court spoke about the difficulties of extending the attorney-
client privilege to Upjohn's lower-echelon employees because the privi-
lege's protections were based on the "intimate relationship" between an 
individual and his lawyer. The court also questioned the effectiveness of 
the subject matter test, voicing concern that corporate counsel would 
become the dumping ground for incriminating facts and that corporate 
executives would be able to shield themselves from information about 
possibly illegal transactions. In the specific context of Upjohn, the court 
also noted the severe burden that the questioning of large numbers of 
foreign citizens would place on the IRS. Concluding that the subject 
matter test would create the potential for a broad "zone of silence," the 
court applied the narrower control group test and held that the bulk of 
the questionnaire answers, letters, and interviews in Upjohn did not 
meet it. 
The court's "shielding" or "dumping" point deserves a closer look, 
because it is a mainstay in cases that rejected the subject matter test. 
The worry is that if communications with field employees are privileged, 
corporations will be encouraged to structure things in such a way that 
illegal conduct could be planned or perpetrated by lower echelon employ-
ees and discussed by them with corporate lawyers-who might aid the 
effort or at least keep quiet about it. The information would be funneled 
to the lawyer and stop there, or be routed through counsel to other lower 
level employees needed for the scheme, without informing, and hence 
shielding, upper management. People outside the business would have 
trouble discovering it. Nor could they discover whether the lawyer told 
upper management about it. Senior executives could thereby insulate 
themselves from the wrongdoing and would have "plausible deniability". 
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They could turn a blind eye with impunity. They would have little 
incentive to take corrective measures. 
But, it may be asked, wouldn't the crime-fraud exception to attor-
ney-client privilege curtail privilege in this nefarious scenario? Wouldn't 
a requirement that a lower-level employee must be authorized by some-
one in authority, to communicate with the lawyer tend to mitigate the 
problem of management deniability? Isn't such a requirement an inte-
gral part of the subject-matter test? For example, in Upjohn itself, the 
Chairman of the Board authorized Thomas's inquiry and directed the 
employees to communicate with Thomas on the matter. Surely Thomas 
would have to report back to executives on the results. Thus, it is hard to 
see how the executives could have shielded themselves . Nevertheless, 
there is something to the court's concern. How major a problem it is, and 
how determinative it should be, was part of the debate that was the 
backdrop for the next stage in Upjohn: the Supreme Court decision. 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN UPJOHN 
Thomas sat in the audience during the argument in the Supreme 
Court. He liked it that no one in the audience knew who he was or that 
he was the central character behind the arguments they were witness-
ing. What he and the audience saw were two of the nation 's top Supreme 
Court advocates squaring off against each other. Both were well known 
to the Justices as fine lawyers, having appeared before them many times. 
The two therefore had a certain cache with the Court. 
Arguing for the government was Lawrence Wallace, a senior career 
attorney with the U.S. Solicitor General 's Office. That office, known as 
" the Government's Law Firm,'' handles virtually all the federal govern-
ment 's work before the Supreme Court, and many other important 
government appellate cases. The Solicitor General has been called the 
"Tenth Justice" because of the extra credibility that office has in the 
eyes of the Court. Wallace had worked, ironically, for Covington & 
Burling immediately following law school. A few years later, he joined 
the Solicitor General's Office, intending to stay two or three years, but 
wound up staying 35 years, as deputy to ten Solicitors General, through 
the administrations of eight presidents beginning with President Lyndon 
J ohnson. He had a steady diet of Supreme Court cases. At six feet tall 
and 200 pounds, with a machine-gun-like, slightly pedantic, extraordi-
narily confident delivery, Wallace was truly formidable . 
On Upjohn 's and Thomas 's side was Covington & Burling's Dan 
Gribbon. Slim, wirey, distinguished, of moderate height, with sparse 
hair, Gribbon is described by Wallace as " having a style of argument 
that was at once friendly, warm, personable, and supremely competent", 
and by Thomas as " physically looking exactly the way a Washington 
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lawyer and partner at Covington & Burling should look". Thomas was 
struck by the fact that Gribbon, during his oral argument, seemed to 
welcome-indeed, enthusiastically embraced-the toughest, potentially 
most damaging and difficult questions from the Justices-especially ones 
that revealed the Achilles heels of his case. Thomas would cringe at such 
a question, thinking all is lost. " I am very glad you asked me that 
question ," Gribbon would say, and genuinely seem to mean it. He would 
go on to painstakingly and thoroughly answer the question . He knew 
that any question represents a problem in the mind of the Justice who 
asks it , and could well be a deciding factor. Thus he viewed questions as 
golden opportunities to get inside the minds of the Justices and resolve 
their problems favorably. His advance preparation, including mooting 
before other lawyers in the firm , always seemed to have anticipated the 
question and supplied him with the best answer possible. Thomas 
reports that Gribbon 's performance was stunning. Thomas knew that 
Gribbon 's daughter, a law student, was in the audience and must have 
felt very proud of her dad. Today she is a federal judge. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals ' decision, holding 
that the " control group" test applied by the Court of Appeals was too 
narrow and overlooked the needs of the lawyer to gather information 
from whomever within the corporation has the information necessary to 
enable the lawyer to render fully-informed and therefore sound legal 
advice-which sound advice serves the public interest in a number of 
ways. Justice (later Chief Justice) Rehnquist who wrote the opinion for 
the Court mentioned the need for predictability and certainty as an 
important reason for discarding the control group test. Nevertheless, to 
the disappointment of many lawyers and scholars the decision in its 
concluding passages declined to (in its own words) " lay down a broad 
rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this 
area" and instead said courts should determine the issue on a case-by-
case basis. 
Although the Upjohn case presented legal questions almost identical 
to those that had divided the Court in Harper & Row a decade earlier, 
this time the Supreme Court had little trouble with the issue, unani-
mously rejecting the control group test as applied by the Court of 
Appeals below. Wallace (the advocate from the Solicitor General 's Office) 
reports that he did not think the case was that open-and-shut, and was 
surprised not to garner even a single vote among the Justices. 
In the first part of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist established that 
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege was to encourage complete 
and honest communication between attorneys and their clients. He cited 
cases dating as far back as the 1880s, concluding that this purpose 
applied equally well regardless of whether the client was an individual or 
a corporation. 
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He then turned his attention to flaws in the control group test. 
First, he criticized the control group test for failing to further the 
original aims of the attorney-client privilege. The control group test's 
emphasis on the employee's ability to act on legal advice from counsel 
did not provide enough protection to encourage a sufficient flow of 
important information to the attorney. Rather, it inhibited it by restrict-
ing the privilege to a small group within the corporation. The Court 
rea oned that without vital facts possessed by non-control group employ-
ee , the corporation would be left without effective legal counsel. Second, 
the upreme Court faulted the control group test's " Robson 's choice": 
the lawyer could either interview non-control group employees without 
the protection of the attorney-client privilege or refrain from interview-
ing them, leaving the company with only a partial understanding of the 
fact of the case. Even if a lawyer could formulate a legal opinion 
without talking to low-level employees, " the control group test made it 
more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice" to the lower level 
employees who would put the policy into effect. Third, the decision 
criticized the control group test for its unpredictability, pointing out that 
contrary decisions in cases applying the control group test showed the 
test 's inherent arbitrariness concerning who is in the control group. The 
Court reasoned that some degree of certainty is essential to encourage 
the free flow of information and that without this knowledge the 
privilege would be ineffectual. 
The final part of the Court 's analysis applied these principles to the 
facts in the case. The Court restated what it considered to be the key 
facts : the communications were made by Upjohn employees to counsel at 
the direction of corporate superiors; Upjohn needed the communications 
as a basis for legal advice; the employees were sufficiently aware that 
they were being questioned so that the corporation could receive legal 
advice; the communications concerned matters within the scope of the 
employees' duties; and Upjohn kept the communications highly confiden-
tial. The Court concluded that protecting the communications was 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege. 
On the other side of the scales, Rehnquist gave relatively short 
shrift to the notion that a broad privilege hinders the discovery of truth 
by making evidence unavailable. He noted that all it renders unavailable 
is the communications themselves, which would probably not be made if 
privilege did not cover them. So there would be little net loss. This is 
because the privilege does not prevent discovery of the underlying facts, 
even though they may have been recounted in the communications. The 
IRS could still summon or subpoena the employees themselves to get the 
facts; it could just not learn what they said to the lawyer about the facts . 
While independently questioning the witnesses might be relatively diffi-
cult or expensive, it is no more so than if the communications had never 
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been made. Indeed, Rehnquist seemed hostile to the notion that difficul-
ty and expense to the government are valid considerations at all when 
discussing the privilege. 
Some commentators have since wondered whether Rehnquist was 
too facile in this whole argument that extending the privilege entails 
little loss to discovering truth. The fact is, communications sometimes 
are-and perhaps were in this case-made for other reasons than privi-
lege. And questioning witnesses independently is not entirely satisfacto-
ry. They may not be as truthful with investigators as with the lawyer, 
and it might be useful both substantively and for impeachment purposes 
for the government to have the statements made to the lawyer. 
At any rate, based on his reasoning, Justice Rehnquist held, for the 
Court, that the privilege extended to communications of the lower 
echelon employees here. But he strictly limited the decision to Upjohn 's 
facts. This was meant to prevent lower courts from thinking that the 
Court implicitly embraced the subject matter test as elaborated in 
Diversified Industries. The Court also did not make any attempt to set 
forth rules or guidelines for determining the scope of the corporate 
attorney-client privilege. This was striking given the growing acceptance 
of the subject matter test in the federal courts and the fact that Chief 
Justice Burger, behind the scenes, was pushing for the Court to adopt a 
modified subject matter test as indicated in his concurring opinion. The 
opinion of the Court, however, was confined to a narrow holding that the 
control group test did not govern the development of the law of the 
attorney-corporate client privilege, and left future development to the 
lower courts.6 
Some have faulted Rehnquist's opinion on the grounds that, in 
failing to adopt a concrete test, and in mentioning a number of pivotal 
features of the communication that might not always be ascertainable at 
the time of the communication, Rehnquist promotes the very uncertain-
ty he decried-uncertainty of application of the privilege, that will 
discourage full and frank communication. But others felt these same 
things constitute strengths: The pivotal features that the communica-
tions should have if they are to be privileged, gives clear indication to 
communicators of what will likely be and not be privileged. Refusing to 
adopt a definitive test leaves desirable flexibility to determine, in an 
extraordinary case, that the privilege is being used to provide too great a 
zone of silence or for other improper purposes. 
6 The decision also held that work-product protection applies to IRS sum monses, and 
that the lower court had applied the wrong standard for overcoming such protection. The 
Supreme Court said mental impressions of the attorney may never be discoverable or may 
be discoverable only on a sign ificantly heightened standard of need. The Court fe lt that it 
need not be more specific because its ruling on a ttorney-client privilege was largely 
dispositive of the case . 
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SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND EFFECTS OF UPJOHN. 
Subsequent Developments in the Case. 
Rehnquist's decision technically remanded the case to the lower 
courts for proceedings consistent with the decision. No one remembers 
precisely what happened on remand, since they all felt the ball game was 
over after the Supreme Court decision. There are no records of any 
subsequent judicial proceedings in any lower court concerning the case. 
To the best anyone can recollect, the IRS saw the handwriting on the 
wall after the Upjohn decision, and got together with Upjohn to settle 
the case. The available evidence suggests that, since the Supreme 
Court 's decision effectively privileged most of the communications at 
issue, the settlement was based on the portions of material voluntarily 
disclosed by Upjohn for which no privilege had been claimed, and on IRS 
interviews with some witnesses on their personal knowledge that was 
not covered by privilege. The IRS and Upjohn agreed that a relatively 
modest payment would be made by the company with essentially no 
adverse impact on the company or any of its employees. They agreed, as 
Upjohn had done with the SEC, that policies would be adopted by 
Upjohn (which had already substantially been done) to prevent similar 
problems in the future. Henceforth foreign payments would have to meet 
certain legal parameters and be handled in a certain way on tax returns. 
Thomas recalls that much of this mirrored what the IRS by this time 
had worked out with other companies regarding foreign payments. 
Subsequent Developments in the Law of Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege. 
Despite Rehnquist 's care in Upjohn only to negate a test centering 
on the control group and not to set forth any alternative test, lower 
federal courts (and those state courts that choose to follow Upjohn )7 have 
tended nevertheless to read the opinion as establishing something very 
akin to the Diversified Industries version of the subject matter test for 
all cases in which a claim of federal corporate attorney-client privilege is 
raised. The Supreme Court should not be surprised. Rehnquist 's enu-
meration in Upjohn, of the significant features of the privileged Upjohn 
communications-corresponding almost identically to the features 
deemed controlling under the subject matter test in Diversified Indus-
tries-could have been expected to be elevated to the status of a " test" 
by lower courts, who are, as a rule, eager for guidance, generally timid, 
7 A dwindl ing number of sta te courts still apply a control group test . The Uniform 
Rules of Evidence, recommended to the states by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Un ifo rm State Laws and by the American Bar Association, incorporated the subject-
matter test into its a ttorney-client privilege provision, after the Upjohn decision by means 
of an amendment, upon which I was advisor . 
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and anxious to stay well within any parameters set by the Supreme 
Court. 
Effect of Upjohn on Corporations and Corporate Law Practice. 
Corporate lawyers generally agree that after Upjohn there was more 
confiding in corporate attorneys (both in-house and outside counsel) , 
which enhanced their ability to obtain information and render good legal 
advice, sometimes enabling them to spot and stop illegal conduct more 
easily, as Justice Rehnquist hoped. Indeed, the Thomas saga proves this 
can and does happen. The degree to which it does is an open question. 
Although Upjohn remains intact today, some lawyers believe that 
recent and accelerating trends among legislators, regulators, other en-
forcement authorities, and corporations themselves, threaten to under-
mine the decision's intended effectiveness in encouraging the flow of 
information to corporate lawyers. These trends-many of them expressly 
designed to penalize or circumvent claims of attorney-client privilege-
became intensified after Upjohn and seem at least in part to be a 
reaction to the broad scope Upjohn gave the privilege. Enforcement 
agencies and some politicians felt that something must be done about 
the way the privilege impedes the discovery and investigation of corpo-
rate wrongdoing-particularly after the 2001 Enron scandal fueled vot-
ers' thirst for punishing corporate miscreants. The public believed-with 
some justification-that lawyers had contributed to the problem or at 
least had kept quiet out of allegiance to their clients. Regarding as 
difficult any direct attempts to overturn Upjohn or the attorney-client 
privilege generally, Congress, regulators, and law enforcement agencies 
instead began increasingly to adopt measures to get around them. These 
measures and some corporate trends exacerbating them fall into four 
categories: 
(1) The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In 2002, in direct response to Enron 
and associated debacles, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
named after the primary legislators who sponsored it. Among other 
provisions, the Act empowers the SEC to adopt rules regulating lawyers 
who handle SEC matters for publicly traded companies or companies 
registered or filing with the SEC. This covers most major American 
companies and any lawyers who advise on or handle matters that might 
potentially involve the SEC-a wide range of matters indeed, because of 
broad SEC disclosure requirements. Almost any matter of substance a 
lawyer might handle for such a company probably has potential disclo-
sure implications, and thus subjects the lawyer to the SEC regulations. 
The SEC has now adopted regulations pursuant to this statutory 
authorization. Some of these permit or require a lawyer to do certain 
things if she becomes aware of credible evidence of a material past, 
future, or ongoing illegal act by or within the corporation that would 
174 THE STORY OF UPJOHN CO. v. UNITED STATES 
constitute fraud or a securities, fiduciary, or similar violation. She must 
report it " up the ladder" within the corporation-that is, to the Chief 
Legal Officer or even the Chief Executive Officer or the Board of 
Directors8 if necessary- and request a response. This mandatory " up the 
ladder " disclosure is designed to overcome the problem of isolating top 
executives from wrongdoing that decisions adopting the "control group" 
view thought was endemic to the broader "subject matter" view ulti-
mately embraced by Upjohn. The " up the ladder" reporting would not 
violate the privilege or customary legal ethics notions of confidentiality, 
because it is reporting within the client, not to the outside, but it could 
worry employees speaking to lawyers. 
If the response from the top of the ladder is unsatisfactory, the 
lawyer is allowed if she wishes to report the wrongdoing and the 
unsatisfactory response to the SEC. This provision is intended to relieve 
her of customary malpractice liability for breaching confidentiality. Such 
reporting to someone outside the client would seem to violate both the 
privilege and the confidentiality requirements contained in the ethics 
rules of many jurisdictions-at least if the wrongdoing is past rather 
than current, continuing, or proposed, which might be within the crime-
fraud exception to the privilege. Since lawyers are licensed to practice in 
a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's local ethics rules would 
normally govern counsel. But the new SEC regulations supersede state 
ethics rules, at least until there is a successful challenge to such 
superseding on constitutional grounds. Some state ethics rules, rules 
recommended by the American Bar Association, and the Restatement 's 
Law of Lawyers, have also recently been amended to allow, or even 
sometimes require, reporting by lawyers to outside persons or entities, of 
serious wrongdoing by clients. Some of these provisions apply only where 
the wrongdoing may involve death or bodily injury, but some go beyond 
this to substantial financial or property harm, or, specifically, business 
fraud or securities violations (in the wake of Enron). 
How do all these new disclosure provisions-and particularly those 
under Sarbanes-Oxley-affect the premise of Upjohn that employees will 
frankly communicate with the corporate attorney if they are covered by 
the corporation's privilege? Would the employees talking to Gerry Thom-
as have been less forthcoming if they thought Thomas might reveal what 
they said to corporate superiors or to law enforcers under these new 
8 The trend in the post-Enron era, sparked by legal reforms and by heightened public 
and busin ess sensitivities, has been for boards of directors to be comprised of more people 
who are independent of ma nagement, and who are much less protective of employees 
implicated in possible wrongdoing, than was the case in the Upjohn era. They are more 
pro ne to terminate such employees or turn them in . This is one of the purposes of the " up 
the ladder" reporting requirement: to produce " transparency" and " house cleaning' ', as it 
is called. 
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provisions?9 Unlikely, since they would have expected top management 
to learn of their reports, and they spoke in an environment where it was 
unclear whether they, as lower-echelon employees, were covered by the 
privilege at all. But there were special circumstances of trust between 
Thomas and the employees, and most of them did not think they were 
doing anything wrong.10 It seems likely that at least in some circum-
stances today, some employees might be more hesitant to disclose self-
damaging material they thought might expose them to civil or criminal 
liability, or to embarrassment or job reprisals, if they thought material 
could be revealed under these new provisions.11 The objective of Upjohn, 
to encourage disclosure by employees, to the corporation's lawyer, is 
undermined to that extent. 
(2) The Spread and Enhancement of Sporkin 's Voluntary Co-opera-
tion Policy. The program of leniency started by SEC enforcement head 
Stanley Sporkin, that treats more leniently those who come forward and 
cooperate with an investigation, is now increasingly found in a wide 
array of regulatory and law enforcement agencies and the Department of 
Justice . In addition, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for crimes, including 
corporate crimes, now give credit that lowers the sentence for co-
operation with the prosecuting authority. 
Under most of these programs, there is an accelerating tendency 
today, which did not exist then, to treat those persons and entities who 
will not waive their attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, 
as failing to co-operate and therefore disentitled to leniency.12 Many 
lawyers believe this is a " gun to the head" requiring waiver. The greater 
the potential penalty, the greater the incentive to waive and get leniency. 
With today's corporations, the penalties can be huge. What makes things 
worse for the waiving party, is the fact that a waiver as to one agency 
waives as to the whole world, regarding the same (and sometimes 
related) material, unless a court subscribes to the "selective waiver" 
doctrine, which few do.13 
9 Thomas would probably have had an ethical duty to warn them of thi , but they 
might have been aware anyway. 
IO They might have thought twice about revealing to a post-Enron board of directors, 
though. See note 8, supra. 
11 Since under the majority view in courts today, there is no notion of " selective 
waiver" of privilege, it may well be that the di sclosure, once made to the SEC, could not be 
confin ed to the SEC. This would make the risks of talking even greater for the employees. 
A lawyer probably should warn of this too . With all these warnings, a frank discussion is 
exceedingly unlikely. 
12 The Justice Department's policy regarding waiver expressly emphasizes the desira-
bility of waiver of a business entity 's attorney-client and work-product protections, clearly 
evidencing an impatience with the Upjohn decision. 
13 The failure of most courts to recognize selective waiver, limiting the waiver to the 
agency receiving the disclosure, can, on occasion , redu ce the incentive to waive by 
increasing the prospect of civil liability asserted by private pla intiffs. 
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The Upjohn employees knew when they were speaking with Thomas 
that he was not their personal attorney, and therefore the privilege was 
not theirs, but rather the corporation's, to raise or waive.14 Again we 
may ask, would they have confided so readily to Thomas if they thought 
there might later be these incentives on the part of the company itself to 
broadly waive its privilege? Maybe they would have because of the 
special circumstances of trust and their belief they were doing nothing 
wrong. But today it seems likely that some corporate employees would be 
reluctant to confide potentially self-damaging or self-incriminating infor-
mation , in view of the waiver incentives operating on the company.15 
Would employees necessarily know about these incentives when confid-
ing in a corporate counsel? In view of the frequency of waiver today, 
probably yes. Anyway, a lawyer in today's regulatory environment proba-
bly would have an ethical duty to alert them to the potential for 
di closure, especially if they risked bearing personally civil or criminal 
liability. To this extent, too, then, Upjohn is weakened. 16 
(3) The Changing Allegiances of Corporations Today. Thomas got 
the information he needed in considerable measure because the employ-
ees knew and trusted the company and its management and felt they 
would be protected if push came to shove, as in fact happened. But a look 
14 Thomas on the Upjohn facts probably could not ethically have represented both, 
even if he wanted to because of the potential for severe (and probably unwaivable) conflicts 
of interest. 
15 Additional waiver incentives for the corporation a rise because, in this post-Enron 
era, independent auditors and audit committees, having been burned by liability for Enron-
type derelictions, will often refu se to certify the accuracy of a company's finan cials, as 
required fo r the company to do business, unless the company allows full examination by 
the auditors even of attorney-client privileged or work-product protected material which, as 
indicated herein , usually means there is a waiver of privilege or protection regarding 
anyone who thereafter seeks this or related information. Worse still , from the corporation 's 
and employees ' standpoint, merely furnishing a report of an internal investigation to 
auditors or government agencies, has been held by some courts today to waive attorney-
client and work-product protections covering underlying materials and conversations, 
e pecially if t he furni shing was to obtain a certification or leniency. In part, this represents 
a post-Enro n extension of the older principle that a party can use a privilege as a "shield 
but not a sword"-that is, if one affirm atively uses material , one cannot prevent the 
exploration of its bone-lides by asserting privilege. 
Addi tional fa r-reaching waiver incentives to the corporation, are presented by the fact 
that, post-Enron, the stock exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) co nduct vigorous investiga-
tions and have adopted policies requi r ing co-operation and (sometimes) waiver similar to 
those described here fo r government agencies. 
16 Further deterring employees from making statements to the corporate lawyer, is the 
fact that t here have been cases in which the Justice Depar t ment has regarded statements 
made by employees to corporate lawyers in a corporation's own internal investigation as 
obstruction-of-justice, which is a crime if the Department feels the statements a re purpose-
ly inaccurate . The theory is that co rporate internal investigations now play a role in law 
enforcement under the new cooperation policies. 
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at the business section of newspapers today reveals a much higher rate 
of corporate turnover. Companies are bought, sold, merged, or taken 
over, and new management comes in that doesn 't have the same stake in 
defending against wrongdoing that occurred under a previous manage-
ment or predecessor corporation. Sometimes the public image and legal 
posture of the new management or entity is better served by taking their 
lumps and confessing that the old crowd were miscreants, but "we are 
different". In fact, recently, many years after Upjohn, the Upjohn 
Company itself was taken over by the Pharmacia Company, which in 
turn was taken over by the Pfizer Company, its current incarnation. 
Dr.William Erastus Upjohn 's family company no longer exists.17 Corpora-
tions also go bankrupt more frequently these days, and are taken over 
and managed by a trustee in bankruptcy who may have no special 
allegiance to the old employees. 
Because the privilege belongs to the company and not to the employ-
ee who confides information, the privilege can be waived by the compa-
ny, by a successor corporation or by a trustee in bankruptcy. This means 
that even a company's CEO cannot count on his confidential communica-
tions to the corporation 's attorneys remaining forever private. Given an 
environment of changing companies and management, where personal 
trust and loyalty are muted, no employee can be sure that he will not be 
" hung out to dry" by existing or new management. 18 Employees at all 
levels may therefore be reluctant to talk candidly to corporate attorneys. 
(4) Expansion of the Privilege's Crime-Fraud Exception and Related 
Doctrines. If the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is 
determined by a court to apply, a privileged conversation can be stripped 
of its privilege. There is a marked modern tendency to expand the crime-
fraud exception. 19 For example, traditionally the crime-fraud exception 
applied only where legal advice was sought or obtained by the client for 
the purpose of committing or facilitating an on-going or future crime or 
fraud, as opposed to seeking legal advice concerning past crimes. The 
latter kind of advice, e.g., advice directed at preparing defenses for a 
crime one has already committed, has been considered squarely within 
the professional functioning of a lawyer and is privileged. 
17 There is something sadly nostalgic about the passing of the company (Upjohn) that 
was responsible for such important drugs (whose names became household words) as 
Cheracol , Kaopectate, Methylprednisalone (the most commonly used low do e steroid fo r 
infl ammation), and Orinase (the most widely used diabetes drug and the fi rst capable of 
oral adm inistration). 
l8 Or the existing or new board of directors. See note 8. 
19 Some lawyers report a corresponding upsurge in instances where regu lators and law 
enforcement authorities a re form ally cha rging lawyers with participation in their client 's 
crime. 
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There is, however , an increasing tendency today for regulators, 
enforcement authorities, and courts, to blur the line between these 
temporal categories . They take the position that legal efforts related to 
past crimes are often really efforts to keep past crimes from coming to 
light, and therefore they amount to a conspiracy to cover-up or further 
deceive. This makes them a continuing crime, within the crime-fraud 
exception . The tendency is particularly marked in the corporate context, 
where there is an obligation to report to the SEC and investors any 
events (even past crimes and frauds) that may result in liabilities of the 
company. The failure to report is a continuing crime or fraud for as long 
a t he initial wrongdoing is not reported or is reported incorrectly or 
insufficiently. The problem is escalated by the fact that in today's highly 
regulated business environment, things that did not seem to be crimes at 
the time of a communication may be regarded as crimes later by a court. 
To the extent there are increased chances that the crime-fraud 
exception might apply, employees confiding to the corporate attorney 
will think twice about what they reveal, because a court may subse-
quently find that their revelations are not privileged, even if the compa-
ny tries to protect the employee and asserts the privilege. 
Further fueling the modern trends that increase the risk of the 
crime-fraud exception applying, is a progressive erosion of the quantum 
of proof required to show that the exception applies. Few courts require 
that it be proved by even a preponderance of evidence. Most require only 
a " prima facie case"-often defined in this area as a showing that would 
justify a reasonable person in thinking that a crime or fraud may be 
involved, without receiving counter-evidence or hearing, cross examina-
tion or impeachment of the witnesses who make out the prima facie case 
or any other appraisal of their credibility. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has held that a judge may hear or inspect in camera the allegedly 
privileged communication, on a lesser showing than needed to establish 
the crime-fraud exception, in order to determine the applicability of the 
crime-fraud exception, and may consider the contents of the communica-
tion in deciding whether the crime-fraud exception applies to the com-
munication. The courts, while applying fairly constant word formulas 
describing these various burdens of proof, have been requiring less and 
less to satisfy them. 
If this is not enough to erode the privilege, some courts are expand-
ing the crime-fraud exception to include more wrongdoing than just 
crimes and fraud- for example, other torts. There is also a tendency for 
courts, when they find a crime or fraud , to broadly strip all communica-
tions between the client and lawyer of the privilege, even those commu-
nications that had nothing to do with the crime or fraud . 
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In view of these enlargements of the crime-fraud exception, employ-
ees communicating with corporate counsel today cannot have the confi-
dence they once had that attorney-client privilege will be sacrosanct. 20 It 
is likely that some of their communications will be chilled. 
Whether these four numbered " inroads" on the encouragement to 
communicate envisioned in Upjohn prove to be well-advised or ill-
advised, most of them seem to stem from a somewhat more jaundiced 
view of the benefits of lawyer-client confidentiality than Upjohn ex-
pressed. While Upjohn did recognize that there must be qualifications on 
an unadulterated policy of confidentiality, and clearly allowed for the 
development of such qualifications, nevertheless, to most lawyers, Up-
john is a soaring endorsement of the lawyer-client privilege and the work 
lawyers do. 
* * * 
In listening to Thomas talk about Upjohn today, you get a strong 
sense that he is most proud of the fact that he kept the faith with the 
employees. He is also very pleased that in the process he secured a 
decision that vindicates the role he always tried to play as corporate 
counsel, and that he believes most corporate counsel play-the role of 
helping the modern corporation do its work, which he believes generally 
is in the public interest. He believes corporate lawyers need to get 
information from employees at every level, in order to perform their role 
effectively. He is of the conviction that most corporations-by no means 
all-are good citizens and try to comply with the complex laws and 
regulations to which they are subject, and that fully informed corporate 
counsel play an indispensable part in that compliance. Next to his 
family, and perhaps his war experiences, you get the feeling that he 
regards Upjohn as a defining event in his life and the capstone of his 
career. He clearly enjoyed almost every minute of it, except perhaps 
when he was jailed in Egypt. 
20 There are also other attorney-client privilege doctrines that are being u ed to defeat 
a company's effort to assert attorney-client privilege to protect their employees communica-
tions. These include penetrating the privilege by dissident shareholders in certain instanc-
es; and the doctrine that the function the attorney was performing for the company when 
he garnered the communication was not a professional legal function but rather a bu iness 
function- i. e., one that was predominantly motivated by business rather than legal 
concerns-and therefore it could have been done by someone who is not a lawyer . The risk 
of this last doctrine being used is highest when the attorney wear s several " hats" in the 
company-that is, he is not only the company's lawyer, but is also on the board of or is a n 
executive officer (other than legal officer) of the company, as Thomas was. 
* 
